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THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
REGULATIONS-A SOLUTION TO THE
UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CRISIS?
Ignorance, as much as self-interest, has dictated much of the
United States' economic policies in the past several decades.
Often it has been a case of policies adopted too late or in too little
quantity or worse the right policy at the wrong time or extremes
which are sate but do not correct.'
This article shall critically examine the Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Regulations (FDIR) of the United States. It is this author's
belief that an analysis of these regulations, their background and
purposes, offers insight into an understanding of economic policies
of the United States Government in regard to the world economic
situation. This belief is buttressed upon the necessity of recognizing
a reciprocal relationship between the United States economy and
the world economy, that is the effect of the economy of the United
States upon those of foreign states and the effect of the economies
of foreign states upon that of the United States. Thus, the FDIR,
though a product of the economic policies of the United States, are
bound up in an economic situation in which every state of the
world, including the United States, is but one participant.
On January 1, 1968, President Johnson, by executive order, put
into effect mandatory controls on United States private direct in-
vestment. 2 These controls are referred to as the FDIR. Acting
pursuant to section 5(b) of the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act,3
the President delegated to the Secretary of Commerce the author-
ity to administer the controls. The Secretary of Commerce then
announced the creation of the Office of Foreign Direct Investments
(OFDI) and delegated to it the authority to administer the Foreign
Direct Investment Program.4
I. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT-ITS MEANING AND
SIGNIFICANCE
The Foreign Direct Investment Program was designed as a
1. Weeks, The Future of Investment Controls, 15 McGILL LAW J. 244, 248. (1969).
2. Exec. Order No. 11,387, 3 C.F.R. § 433, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1970).
3. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1970).
4. Dep't of Commerce Order 184-A, 33 Fed. Reg. 54 (1968).
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response to a crisis, and thus the question of its permanency ap-
pears to be dependent upon the elimination of that crisis. The crisis
was that the United States had recorded deficits in its balance of
payments accounts for seventeen of the eighteen years in the period
1950-1967. And the crisis has continued in each subsequent year
since the introduction of the mandatory controls.
The significance of a balance of payments deficit will be lost
unless its essentials are first understood.
In the simplest terms, a nation incurs a balance of payments
deficit whenever more units are paid out than are returned.
Under the "liquidity" concept presently used by the United
States Department of Commerce, the definition of "balance" is
not, however, merely a matter of applying accounting techniques
to all transactions involving foreigners. An analysis of the nature
and purpose of the transaction must be made, and only those
transactions that are "regular" are included in the balance com-
putation. Within this definitional framework income from
United States investments abroad, foreign investments in the
United States, and return on United States exports are the regu-
lar transactions that have a positive impact on the payments
account, and governmental spending abroad, private foreign in-
vestment, and payments for foreign imports are the deficit trans-
actions.'
Under both of the official measurements of the United States
balance of payments-the liquidity basis and the official settle-
ments basis 6-the resulting surplus or deficit reflects changes in
United States official reserve assets, a deficit resulting in a drain
on the United States reserve position. But a key fact, which the
measurements of the United States balance of payments do not
reflect, is that United States total foreign assets greatly exceeded
liabilities and thus "[t]he problem [is] then not one of solvency, but
of the country's liquidity or cash position."7
5. Young, Governmental Regulation of Foreign Investment, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 421,
421-22 (1969) (footnote omitted).
6. The official settlements balance considers changes in the dollar claims of foreign
monetary authorities and reserve losses of the United States, but excludes private transac-
tions, thus reflecting only transactions between governments. But the liquidity computation
of the balance of payments treats increases in "liquid" liabilities to foreigners as financing
or settling the overall deficit-i.e., short-term foreign debts of the United States are in-
cluded while short-term claims owed to the United States are not.




As a member of the International Monetary Fund.(IMF), the
United States, as it kept on recording deficits in its balance of
payments accounts, found itself seriously confronted with two
basic provisions of the IMF: (1) all United States dollars, the
"standard" currency of the international monetary system, were
convertible into gold at the rate of thirty-five dollars per ounce; and
(2) the United States is obliged to repurchase dollars at fixed ex-
change rates from other members of the IMF who wish to sell
them to the United States. Because of these two provisions of the
IMF, a deficit in the United States balance of payments accounts
gave a country with a surplus balance of payments position a set
of options:
The function of the IMF is to make the currency of each
nation freely convertible into other currencies at an international
exchange rate. . . .In practice, stability of exchange is accom-
plished by the central bank of the foreign nation with a balance
of payments deficit buying its currency in world markets with
dollars, thereby reducing the supply of its currency and returning
the exchange rate to a parity. On the other hand, a country with
a surplus balance of payments position will exchange its own
currency for dollars to increase the supply of its currency and
reduce the price to parity. The surplus country can in this manner
increase the dollar holding in its reserve account, or it may elect
to redeem the dollars for gold. The policies of central banks are
reflected in the composition of their reserve assets and are the
result of many diverse factors, one of which is the current
strength of the dollar.'
With the convertibility of dollars into gold provision, the basic
stability of the dollar was questioned by foreign countries having
a balance of payments surplus any time the United States gold
reserves fell to a level that caused foreigners to question the ability
of the United States to redeem outstanding dollars with gold at the
fixed price. Unless the United States maintained a somewhat sta-
ble balance of payments position, it was inevitable that foreign
ownership of dollars would increase, resulting in a corresponding
increase in United States liabilities. "Even if the relative redemp-
tion percentage of dollars into gold remain[ed] constant, the in-
crease in dollars available in foreign hands alone [would] result in
a more rapid depletion of United States gold reserves . . .-




Such causal relationships, reflecting the chain-like progression of
events in a nation facing a balance of payments deficit, ultimately
resulted in a lessened confidence in the stability of the dollar.
The second IMF provision, dealing with the repurchase of dol-
lars at fixed exchange rates, coupled with deficits in the United
States balance of payments accounts, produced an effect upon the
stability of the dollar which was largely emotional and thus uncon-
trollable-the fear that United States reserves might be insufficient
to permit repurchase of all dollars that would be offered in case of
a speculative run on the dollar.
The very chance that the United States will be unable to meet
its repurchase obligations, abetted by the possibility of continu-
ing inflationary pressure on the dollar, increases the instability
of the dollar. The greater the United States international obliga-
tions in relation to its reserves, the greater will be the instability
of its currency. Because most other Western currencies are based
at least in part on dollar reserves, the stability of these currencies
is threatened as well. While under the present international mon-
etary system moderate United States balance-of-payments defi-
cits may be needed to provide a necessary increase in world
liquidity, large deficits are too great a destabilizing influence.
Consequently, the United States has been forced to take action
designed to reduce its large balance-of-payments deficit in order
to maintain international confidence in the dollar. 0
II. MAJOR CAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS DEFICITS
History shows two major causes of the United States balance
of payments deficits. Indeed, throughout the fifties, the deficits
were neither alarming nor harmful and were readily explainable.
Although the United States' international balance of payments
had been slowly losing ground through the 1950's, the annual
increase in the country's deficit was not then insupportable in
view of the fact that much of the deficit was attributable to the
dollar increasingly becoming the reserve currency of the interna-
tional economy: if the dollar was to be a reserve currency, other
countries had to own dollars. . . .By 1960, the deficit had
reached proportions sufficient to call into question international
confidence in the dollar."
10. Comment, American Private Direct Investment In Eastern Europe: Intersection of
Business Interests and Foreign Policy. 21 STAN. L. REV. 8*77, 918 (1969) (footnote omitted).
II. Lancaster, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: A Look at Ad Hoc
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As the deficits became more alarming, throughout the 1960's, sev-
eral serious errors in financial judgment by the United States Gov-
ernment stood out as the major causes of the balance of payments
crisis. The first error in judgment was that the United States, in
providing aid for the rebuilding of war-torn economies after World
War II, did so primarily on a grant basis rather than in repayable
loans.' 2 The rationale was that the economists administering the
foreign aid program "had so little confidence in the success of their
plans for European recovery that they fully expected European
trade and finance to continue indefinitely in a deficit relationship
to the United States."'" What happened, though, was that Europe
did recover, and the European countries began to have surplus
balance of payments accounts. One writer pointed out what would
have been the effect if the United States had provided repayable
loans to, for example, France:
If instead of largely forgotten grants-and the total grants by
the United States to France aggregate $7 1/ billion-we now had
some Marshall Plan loans repayable by France with her excellent
gold and reserves, all of the current gold problems of the United
States, resulting from French demands for gold, would vanish."
But even the return of the loan basis to the foreign aid program
has mixed blessings.
In the more recent past, especially since 1958, the foreign aid
program has been returning to a "loan" basis of a sort, but these
loans are largely in terms of repayment in local currencies in-
stead of dollars and lack any maintenance-of-value clauses.
Thus, the United States loses to the extent of any devaluation or
depreciation of local currencies. For example, the U.S. Treasury
has been selling Indonesian rupiahs at an exchange rate of 5,000
to $1 in comparison to U.S. acquisition cost of those currencies
under loan agreements at an exchange rate of 45 to $1, a loss on
the Indonesian currency loans of more than $.99 on the dollar."3
The second error in financial judgment concerned expenditures
for United States military operations abroad. During World War
II, the United States carried out its military operations abroad
Rulemaking, 55 VA. L. REv. 83, 84-85 (1969).
12. Hynning, Balance-of-Payments Controls by the United States, 2 INT. LAWYER 400,
406 (1968).
13. Id. at 407.
14. Id. at 411.
15. Id. at 412.
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without experiencing any balance of payments problems. "The
reason was that under lend-lease and reverse lend-lease, there were
few if any transfers of credits or cash between the United States
and foreign countries."' 6 Thus, the need of each government for the
currency of the other was reduced to a minimum. However, after
World War II, the principle was established by the United States
that the country would go over to a "pay as you go" basis for the
local support of our military operations. "[A]nd since the United
States did the 'going' by maintaining troops and dispatching equip-
ment abroad, it also did the 'paying'."' 1 Thus, the presence of
United States military forces within a foreign country became an
automatic guaranty of financial prosperity for that country, which
could then have a surplus balance of payments.
While the above two major causes of the United States balance
of payments deficits could be considered long-term causes, the
1960's saw other significant causes of a shorter-term vari-
ety-causes which ultimately led to a balance of payments crisis
and the creation of the FDIR.
The renewed increase in private loans and investments abroad,
the growing cost of the Vietnam war, the inflationary spiral, the
diminishing trade surplus, the jump in American tourism abroad,
and the loss of confidence in the dollar following the devaluation
of the British pound threatened a monetary crisis of serious mag-
nitude. The mandatory Foreign Direct Investment Regulations
are part of the response to that crisis.'8
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS
The concept of foreign direct investment and its effect upon the
balance of payments can be looked upon in three different man-
ners-each of which focuses upon a different relationship. Yet, a
look at the total picture is illuminating and necessary in order to
analyze the effectiveness of the FDIR as a means of improving the
16. Id. at 413. Lend-lease worked in this way:
Under lend-lease the United States furnished its military allies with all the mili-
tary hardware, guns, airplanes, tanks, ammunition, clothing, food stuffs, and the use
of ships. . . . In return, the United States received as reverse lend-lease, in the U.K.
and later in France and other European countries, use of local real estate for flying
fields, barracks, storage depots, maneuvering, local commodities, and services.
Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 417.
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 497.
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United States balance of payments position.
In statistical terms, foreign direct investment is a debit item
in determining the balance of payments. It is an outflow of capi-
tal which gives foreigners the same purchasing power they would
hdve if the money came from the sale of imports to the United
States. Viewed in a more realistic manner, however, direct for-
eign investment involves the creation of a foreign enterprise to
sell goods and services and to generate profits for reinvestment
abroad or for repatriation to the direct investor in the United
States. In a larger sense, foreign direct investment has been a
major factor in the economic growth of the world and has made
available to other nations not only dollars, but also advanced
technological and managerial skills.'"
Direct investment generally refers to money spent on corporate
capital stock, bond purchases, plant purchases abroad, and similar
investments. Yet, the Regulations require an understanding of the
refinements of international balance of payments accounting on
the above conception of investment abroad. 0
IV. FDIR-A MEANS OF SOLVING THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
CRISIS?
If foreign direct investment is considered solely as an outflow
19. Young, supra note 5, at 427 (footnote omitted).
20. See Lancaster, supra note 11, at 99-100 (footnotes omitted), where the author states:
The Regulations apply only to certain of those expenditures which might com-
monly be regarded as foreign investment or as affecting the balance of payments.
Buy a Rolls-Royce in the United Kingdom and drive it around the streets of Dallas,
buy a chateau in the Loire valley in France and vacation in it, buy a ship in Japan
and use it in the coastwise trade in the United States, buy a railroad locomotive from
Germany and use it in Pennsylvania, buy a Belgian patent for your Cleveland fac-
tory's use-all of these transactions may have adversely affected the United States'
balance of payments position, but none will be regarded as a direct investment or a
transfer of capital. . . within the reach of the Regulations. . . . On the other hand,
sell one hundred thousand washing machines to your British subsidiary for resale to
customers there on what they call "hire purchase" and be paid off by your subsidiary
as the retail customers pay for their machines; buy an offshore oil-drilling rig from
a yard in New Orleans and tow it to a spot in the southern Caribbean for more than
a year's work manned by Americans and supplied by Americans; have a ship built
in an American shipyard and assign it to a foreign-flag subsidiary; take some old
well-drilling equipment where it is rusting in storage in the Orient and eating up
rental payments to a foreign warehouse, and contribute it as your share of a joint
venture in the Middle East; cart a few shiploads of American road-building equip-
ment to France and build a road there in thirteen months entirely with American
personnel-in each case a transfer of capital resulting in a direct investment will
result and will be subject to the OFDI restrictions (unless there is a corresponding
transfer of capital back to the investor before the end of the same year and, for OFDI
purposes, from a country in the same scheduled area).
19721
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of capital-a debit item-in determining the United States balance
of payments position, the investment controls, by reducing the
outflow of capital, should have a favorable impact upon this coun-
try's payments position. But since the major causes of the deficits
lie elsewhere, as previously discussed, the creation of the FDIR
constituted more of a political than an economic response to the
payments crisis.
When the balance-of-payments problem became more press-
ing for the United States in 1963-1964, the attack was focused
on private lending and private investment abroad, rather than on
foreign aid and foreign military expenditures and assistance. The
private sectors presumably constituted easier targets that were
available in ways that did not involve the vested interests and
techniques of government. Hence, it was concluded to tax and
control private lending and investment rather than to reform
foreign aid and the military. Moreover, these taxes and controls
fitted in with the need felt for allocation of sacrifice in the current
crises .21
Yet even with the favorable impact of investment controls, a
favorable over-all economic position will not necessarily result.
Other factors, besides foreign direct investment, have a considera-
ble impact upon the economic picture of the United States and of
each of the foreign states in the world. Foreign trade, foreign
exchange, economic development, balance of payments as well as
foreign direct investment are all a part of such an economic picture
but these factors do not necessarily act in concert, so that improve-
ment in any one or two of these will not necessarily result in a
favorable economic position.
Therefore, the world's economy is, like the law, a seamless web.
Granted, variations of some magnitude as between countries will
always be present, and, on a short-term basis, improvement in
any of the respective components will register as a favorable
indicator in the over-all situation. Unfortunately, governments
tend to suffer a degree of myopia when they assiduously apply
their efforts to one or two of the components in the mistaken
belief that these are actually the total problem instead of symp-
toms. Like symptoms of disease, they too must be treated if total
recovery of the patient is to be achieved.2 1
21. Hynning, supra note 12, at 418.
22. Weeks, supra note 1, at 247-48.
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Of course, the above discussion of the impact of the FDIR on the
balance of payments problem has been premised upon the belief
that a reduction in outflow of capital would improve the balance
of payments. Indeed, such was the view of the United States Gov-
ernment.2 3 But this belief has been subject to harsh criticism. As
one writer argues:
Is there a demonstrable case for this view that a major cause
for the U.S. balance-of-payments crisis is private lending and
investment abroad? Obviously, any bank which lends money
abroad or any business enterprise which makes capital invest-
ments abroad is by definition making a negative contribution to
the balance of payments of the United States-that is, the out-
flow of loan and investment funds from the United States to
foreign investment funds from the United States to foreign in-
vestment adds that much to the deficit in the balance of pay-
ments. But that definitional answer fails to take into account the
inflow of dividends, interest, royalties, and fees received on pri-
vate investments abroad. And that answer overlooks the close
relationship of investment abroad to export trade. It is only a
small chapter in the story if we look at the capital outflow alone.
When we add up the investment income received by the United
States from investment abroad, deduct the investment income
paid out to foreigners on their investments in the United States,
and deduct the current capital outflow, we do not find figures to
support a conclusion for reducing United States investment
abroad for balance-of-payments reasons. . . .Continued reli-
ance on restrictions of capital outflow for private investment
abroad, which have invariably been productive of greater future
earnings, is a short-term situation and indeed slays the goose that
lays the golden egg.24
In writing this evaluation of the FDIR-their goals, policies
and effectiveness-a major obstacle to an accurate evaluation of
the current effectiveness of investment controls "lies in the in-
grained habit of both the press and certain government officials to
use different guidelines when reporting the current state of affairs
in this area."2" Yet regardless of this difficulty, after four years of
the mandatory FDIR in the United States, our balance of pay-
23. Young, supra note 5, at 429. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MAINTAINING THE
STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES DOLLAR IN A STRONG FREE WORLD ECONOMY 55
(1968).
24. Hynning, supra note 12, at 405.
25. Weeks, supra note I, at 244.
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ments problem is still with us, and there is no conclusive evidence
that the FDIR are any more or less responsible for the current
deficit. Thus, while the goal remains clear, the path to it has not
yet been found.
This in essence is the crux of the entire subject of international
trade and finance-no one can agree on the best specific methods
of assuring continued improvement. In fact, about the only abso-
lute source of agreement is that the proper balance between in-
flows and outflows of capital is essential for a properly function-
ing international as well as domestic economy. The goal but not
the means seems, then, to be the only item which is clearly de-
fined.2"
And so the subsequent discussion in this article shall necessarily
limit itself to an underlying issue-the extent to which the FDIR
succeed in meeting four priorities with which foreign investment
abroad should be concerned:
First, strengthening of the domestic economy of the investor's
own country through the returns on the invested capital. Second,
working to increase the individual investor's wealth. Third, pro-
moting the economic development of the country and countries
in which the investment is made. Fourth, developing a healthy
and stable international economic situation, kept so through
sound monetary policies and an extremely high degree of interna-
tional cooperation.Y
V. SUMMARY OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE FDIR
The FDIR impose certain restraints on investment in "affili-
ated foreign nationals" by United States "direct investors". 2 An
affiliated foreign national (AFN) is a foreign corporation, partner-
ship, or unincorporated business venture in which at least a ten
percent interest is owned by a "person", i.e., an individual, corpo-
ration, business venture, trust or estate, within the United States. 21
26. Id. at 251.
27. Id. at 250.
28. The FDIR appear in Title 15, Chapter X, Part 1000 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. Hereinafter, the FDIR will be cited by section number and without the prefix "1000".
Reprints of the FDIR are available from OFDI. The 1970 General Bulletin: Interpretative
Explanation and Analysis of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations [hereinafter cited
as 1970 Bulletin], published by the Office of Foreign Direct Investments in 35 Fed. Reg.
195 (Oct. 7, 1970), represents the official position of the OFDI and is an invaluable aid in




That "person" is called a direct investor (DI) 0 To determine
whether a "person" has acquired sufficient interest to be a DI, the
interest is measured by voting power if the AFN is a corporation,
and by a right to share in profits if the AFN is unincorporated .3
Notwithstanding the above, the Secretary of Commerce retains
full power to determine that any business is an AFN of any "per-
son" within the United States and to determine the scheduled area
in which such affiliated foreign national is located.3 2
Direct investment, which is calculated during a given period,
usually on a calendar year basis, consists of (1) the "net transfer
of capital" by the DI to its incorporated and unincorporated AFNs
plus (2) the DI's share of earnings of its incorporated AFNs which
have been reinvested.33 Thus, the concept of direct investment as
well as that of "net transfer of capital" refers to the net total of
transactions over a period of time, not to a single transaction. "Net
transfer of capital" 34 may be briefly summarized in the following
manner:
Generally, a transfer of capital by a DI to an AFN is a transfer
of funds or other property that increase the DI's aggregate equity
or debt investment in the AFN. Conversely, a transfer of capital
by an AFN to a DI is generally a transfer of funds or other
property that reduces the DI's aggregate equity or debt invest-
ment in the AFN.
Net transfer of capital to incorporated AFNs for a given period
is the aggregate of transfers of capital by the DI less the aggre-
gate of transfers of capital by the incorporated AFNs to the DI
during the same period. Net transfer of capital to unincorporated
AFNs for a given period is the DI's share of the aggregate in-





34. § 313. The concept "net transfer of Capital" is discussed generally in Lancaster,
supra note II, where the author states at 105:
A net transfer of capital is defined in terms of all of a direct investor's AFNs in
a particular scheduled area. From a balance of payments point of view, it matters
not at all whether a direct investor has one AFN or hundreds in a particular country
or area. What is of importance is the sum total of transactions to a particular country
or area. For the foregoing reason, the separate identities of all of a direct investor's
foreign business operations within the same scheduled area are ignored, for their
numbers do not affect the sum of the transactions between the direct investor and
his AFNs in the area.
1972]
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(whether such net increase or decrease results from transfers of
capital, earnings or losses).15
Besides regulating positive direct investment, the FDIR restrict
the amount of "liquid foreign balances"-money on deposit in
foreign banks and negotiable or non-negotiable instruments of
unaffiliated foreign nationals with a period of less than a year
remaining to maturity when acquired-that may be held by a DI.
Ordinarily, the amount of such balances that a DI may hold at the
end of each month cannot exceed the greater of $100,000 or the
average month-end amount of liquid foreign balances held by the
DI in 1965 and 1966.36
The FDIR assign each of the countries of the world to one of
three scheduled areas, A, B, and C.17 Direct investment by a DI
is generally determined on the basis of a scheduled area, reflecting
aggregate transactions involving all AFNs in such schedule. Sched-
ule A consists of the developing countries while Schedule B in-
cludes a limited number of industrialized or partially industrialized
countries, such as Australia, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, certain Middle East oil-producing nations and
Spain. The countries in Schedule C include those not included in
Schedule A or B, such as South Africa and the industrialized
countries of Western Europe. The FDIR do not restrict direct
investment or liquid foreign balances in Canada, although any
DIs investing in Canada are required to file with the OFDI the
same reports that DIs with AFNs in other countries must submit.
The amount of positive direct investment that a DI is permitted
to make during a calendar year depends upon which "allowable"
the DI chooses. A DI may elect one of two "minimum" allowables:
(1) worldwide positive direct investment of not more than
35. OFFICE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS, SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS (May 3, 1971). See § 312, on "transfers of capital", and § 313,
on "net transfer of capital". The very act of becoming a DI for the first time is regarded
as a "transfer of capital". § 312(a). It should be noted that if one DI disposes of all or part
of its interest in an AFN to another entity which then becomes a DI in its own right with
respect to such AFN, there is no transfer of capital because nothing has left the United
States and, thus, there has merely been a redivision of the interests that existed before the
sale. § 312(c)(1). For the implications of this provision to prospective purchasers of a Dl's
interest in an AFN, see generally Lancaster, supra note II, at 111-12. On determining the






$2,000,000 each year,38 or (2) $2,000,000 per year in Schedules B
and C plus an additional $4,000,000 a year that may be invested
only in Schedule A.31 If a DI chooses to use one of these allowa-
bles, it cannot shift to the other in the following year without OFDI
authorization. There appears to be underlying these allowables a
policy decision which is indeed significant:
These provisions, then, appear to evince a clear policy to alleviate
the previous bias in the OFDI program against smaller investors
having no base period investment history while at the same time
guarding against larger investors who might otherwise elect the
section 503 [$2,000,000 worldwide] allowable to circumvent the
purposes of the program. On the other hand, the recent adoption
of the section 507 supplemental allowable of $4 million for
Schedule A investment in addition to investment in Schedules B
and C . . . may render the Regulations superfluous for all but
the biggest investors. 0
Alternatively, a DI may choose one of two other allowables.
The "historidal" allowable authorizes an annual amount of posi-
tive direct investment in each schedule area based upon the follow-
ing percentages of the DI's average annual direct investment in the
respective area in the years 1965 and 1966: Schedule A, 110 per-
cent; Schedule B, 65 percent; and Schedule C, 35 percent.4' The
"earnings" allowable permits a DI an annual amount of positive
direct investment in each scheduled area based upon 40 percent of
its share of the previous year's earnings of its AFNs in the respec-
tive scheduled area.42 This latter allowable too has an underlying
policy significance:
In order to benefit the investor with little or no historical allowa-
bles, the section 504(b) optional earnings allowable was instituted
. . . The rationale for the earnings allowable, which is an impor-
tant departure from the base period concept, is that earnings
should bear a closer relationship to our balance of payments
objectives and that quotas based upon earnings provide a self-
applying formula for the growth and expansion of direct invest-
ment abroad. Also, the earnings allowable can be increased or
decreased according to the needs of the current balance of pay-
38. § 503.
39. § 507.





ments situation. The long-range nature of this planning, however,
hints strongly at the possibility that the OFDI program will be
with us for some time to come.43
In addition to the four allowables previously discussed, a DI
may also qualify for an "incremental earnings" allowable.
This allowable is available on a worldwide basis and is equal to
the amount by which 40 percent of the DI's share of the increase
in the earnings of its AFNs in the current year over its share of
the average annual earnings of its AFNs in 1966 and 1967 ex-
ceeds the amount of positive direct investment the DI has avail-
able to it under the minimum, historical or earnings allowable."
The purpose of this provision is to aid DIs having AFNs with
rapidly increasing earnings since those investors "may be the larg-
est contributors to the equilibrium of the United States' balance
of payments."45
The FDIR provide that all or part of any positive direct invest-
ment authorized in Schedule C countries may be made instead in
Schedule A or B, and any investment authorized in Schedule B
countries may be used instead in Schedule A.46
DIs are also able to meet foreign investment plans through the
use of proceeds of "long-term foreign borrowing."47 Proceeds of
long-term foreign borrowing expended in making transfers of capi-
tal or "allocated" to positive direct investment are deducted in
determining the DI's net transfers of capital or positive direct
investment," while a charge against a DI's allowables is made only
upon repayment of the borrowing.49 Subpart J of the FDIR author-
izes positive direct investment in excess of a DI's allowables result-
ing from repayment of long-term foreign borrowing, provided the
DI has satisfied certain specified conditions.
The FDIR provide that a DI may apply for a "specific authori-
zation" of positive direct investment otherwise prohibited by the
Regulations, a "specific exemption" from complying with certain
requirements or provisions of the Regulations, and an "interpreta-
43. Comment, supra note 7, at 520.
44. SUMMARY, supra note 35, at 3.
45. Lancaster, supra note II, at 132.
46. §§ 504, 507.
47. § 324.




tive opinion" of the Regulations with respect to a particular factual
situation.5 1
Certain reports are required to be filed with the OFDI by DIs.
51
Both criminal and administrative sanctions are provided for in the
Regulations . 2
VI. THE TRI-SCHEDULAR APPROACH-FOREIGN AID CONSIDER-
ATIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF ECONOMIC POLICY
The separation of the countries of the world into three distinct
Schedules in the FDIR cannot entirely be explained on balance of
payments grounds alone. Indeed, such grounds do not require the
classification of countries at all. "Certainly the immediate balance
of payments effect of a dollar investment in a Schedule A country
is no less than that of a similar investment in a Schedule C country.
Each investment represents the outflow of one dollar. ' '53 But the
tri-schedular approach operates to favor investment in certain
countries at the expense of investment in others. Clearly political
judgments and foreign policy determinations have played a signifi-
cant role in the formulation of the Schedules, and thus the tri-
schedular approach that resulted achieves a distribution of private
investment closely akin to the distribution of United States foreign
aid. One professor of law elaborates upon the rationale for the use
of three Schedules in the FDIR:
It is the judgment of the United States, then, that it is not alone
in the struggle for international monetary stability-that the sta-
bility of the international monetary system, and with it the stabil-
ity of the United States monetary system, depends on the eco-
nomic health of many other countries. Reduction of the level of
the United States' imbalance of international payments must not
be accomplished at the expense of other nations which are
weaker from an international monetary standpoint, if the result
50. § 801. Instructions for submitting such applications are set out in detail in Revised
Instructions for Submitting Applications for Specific Authorizations, Specific Exemptions
or Interpretations (February 23, 1971), in 1971 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM,
published by the Office of Foreign Direct Investment. Reprints are available from OFDI.
51. § 602.
52. § 701. See generally Comment, supra note 7, at 528-29. On the use of settlement
procedures by OFDI in cases of noncompliance, see generally Freedman, Administrative
Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 PA. L. REv. 1, 82 (1970), and
Comment, supra note 7, at 529.
53. Note, The Foreign Direct Investment Program: An Analysis and Critique, 55 VA.
L. REv. 139, 170-71 (1969).
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of such accomplishment is to jeopardize the stability of the inter-
national monetary system itself. 4
Criticism of the FDIR approach has been substantial and three
alternative approaches have been suggested. The first suggestion
would do away with the Schedules altogether, primarily because
of their interference with the flexibility necessary for business in-
vestment. As one attorney argues:
International business is in no way carried on under a frag-
mented three schedule approach. As a result, the Regulations,
which provide for progressive restriction as one proceeds from
Schedule A through C, have been particularly harsh on the larger
international corporations which have made such substantial
contributions to the balance of payments. Accordingly, OFDI
should conform the Regulations to normal business practice and
ameliorate the effects of this three-tiered approach, even if the
Regulations are to be continued for the short run. Inducements
to investment in the under-developed countries should be con-
fined to the Treasury's income tax treaty program, which pro-
gram should now be accelerated.55
Of course, "[a]ny controls which curtail the United States' partici-
pation in investment in less developed countries run contrary to our
most basic long-range foreign policy interests."" The second
suggestion involves the substitution of a new schedular approach,
based solely on balance of payments considerations, for the present
one.
The [present] system fails to recognize that there are many less-
developed countries which have intimate financial relationships
with highly developed countries, such as France, which are em-
barked upon a major onslaught on the dollar. The result of that
relationship is that the exemption of countries as less-developed
provides a major source of seepage of U.S. funds into France. It
would make far more sense to classify the countries into two
categories, namely, (A) the countries which enter into satisfac-
tory financial arrangements with the Secretary of the Treasury
of the United States for the cooperative defense of the dollar, and
(B) countries which do not.5 7
54. Lancaster, supra note 11, at 97.
55. Scott, Tax and Other Implications of the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations,
47 TAXES 32, 37 (1969).
56. Note, supra note 53, at 172.
57. Hynning, supra note 12, at 432. See also Note, supra note 53, at 171, where the
writer states: "If balance of payments effect were solely responsible for the tri-schedular
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But the third suggestion calls for the reclassification of countries
in the world within the present tri-schedular approach whenever
necessary for foreign policy or balance of payments reasons. For
example, one writer proposes changing the FDIR's treatment of
investment in Eastern Europe:
Accordingly, the President should direct the Secretary of
Commerce to use his discretionary power to reappraise the
schedule classification of all Eastern European countries. The
Secretary of Commerce should then reassign these countries to
schedules appropriate to their economic capacities, their need for
development capital, and their ability to satisfy these needs from
non-United States sources. For example, East Germany's high
degree of industrialization and its ability to obtain capital for
continued industrialization from the USSR seem to justify its
retention in schedule C. On the other hand, the relatively unde-
veloped economic conditions of Rumania and Bulgaria-very
much on an economic par with Yugoslavia-should require that
they be placed along with Yugoslavia in schedule A. The other
Eastern European nations-Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Po-
land-are neither as highly developed as East Germany nor as
undeveloped as Bulgaria or Rumania. Because these other coun-
tries are at most as developed as other schedule B countries, they
should also be placed in schedule B, and perhaps even in schedule
C. 5 8
Thus, the present tri-schedular approach is essentially a com-
promise or blending of foreign policy and balance of payments
considerations. The justification for placing each country in a par-
ticular Schedule will always be explainable because of this compro-
mise. But since the elements of this compromise often work at
cross-purposes to each other, this writer cannot help but wonder if
the present tri-schedular approach isn't doing more harm than
good as a key provision in the FDIR.
VII. OFDI-A WORKABLE MECHANISM TO CONTROL INVEST-
MENT ABROAD?
A. At the Domestic Level-Effect of OFDI on Investors
By definition, investment controls interfere with the process of
investing abroad by direct foreign investors and the managing of
system, the countries should be allocated to schedules according to their willingness to adopt
measures supporting dollar stability."
58. Comment, supra note 10, at 925-26 (footnote omitted).
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such investments. Thus, a basic criticism of investment controls is
that they
can result in economic starvation or malnutrition of existing
direct foreign investments by not permitting sufficient flexibility
to the direct foreign investor or by virtually coercing him to seek
investment in, from his standpoint, a less favorable country. 9
Indeed, this criticism may be partly responsible for one writer's
characterization of the history of the Regulations "as the story of
rigorous rules being subsequently relaxed" 6"-for example, the in-
creases in the minimum allowables. On the other hand, this criti-
cism illustrates a crucial lack of understanding of the operating
effect of the FDIR-that is, not to restrict investment, but rather
to shift its financing to foreign sources. Also, the OFDI retains a
great deal of flexibility in granting specific authorizations in a
given year.
[S]o long as there is some flexibility in adjusting the aggregate
amount permissible for specific authorizations in a given year, a
decision to grant any particular application for a specific authori-
zation will rarely, if ever, have the effect of foreclosing the possi-
bility that a subsequent application of comparable merit will be
granted. Moreover, a decision to deny an application for a spe-
cific authorization has effect for a limited period only, prohibit-
ing the direct investor from undertaking the proposed enterprise
for the remainder of the calendar year but leaving him free to
do it the following year. It may sometimes be true that the im-
pact of denial will be more severe, at least when the inability to
accept a business opportunity now means that the opportunity
will be lost forever, but in some cases it will be equally true that
the direct investor can take up the opportunity by paying higher
interest rates abroad.61
One writer has suggested that because of the need and desire of DIs
to seek specific authorizations, there has been little opposition to
the investment controls from the business community. "The risk
of courting the displeasure of the federal government apparently
outweighed the value to be gained from attacking the regulatory
scheme." 6
One other criticism also made by DIs is that the FDIR are too
59. Weeks, supra note I, at 255.
60. Lancaster, supra note 11, at. 121. Lancaster gives examples at 121-125.
61. Freedman, supra note 52, at 73.
62. Note, supra note 53, at 164.
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complex and that compliance with them is unduly expensive and
inconvenient. Notwithstanding the validity of this criticism, it is
met by a favored bureaucratic response, though not necessarily
untrue:
Complexity. . . is inevitable where the subject matter is as intri-
cate and difficult to regulate as foreign direct investment. Indeed,
simplicity would have resulted in great injustices because of the
undoubted ability of multinational enterprises to thwart any sim-
ple scheme. Sophisticated business calls for sophisticated regula-
tion.63
B. At the Domestic Level-OFDI as Regulatory Program
The creation of OFDI as a regulatory program, rather than as
a legislative one, in response to the balance of payments crisis,
appears to have been beneficial to its development and functioning.
As one former official of OFDI has commented:
[I]n all probability the most influential factor contributing to
OFDI's accomplishments has been the freedom of responsive
and responsible men from the straightjacket of the legislative
process-a freedom to meet each day's crisis unhampered by the
supposed permanence of yesterday's decisions. OFDI has been
free to learn from mistakes and make swift changes without
unduly prejudicing people who had relied on such mistakes.
OFDI has been free to listen to its public on a day to day basis,
and to follow closely statistical and financial developments in its
area of responsibility. OFDI could not have operated in this
manner if its regulatory program had been a legislative pro-
gram.64
But another writer sees the above view as a common "rationaliza-
tion for unfettered and unchecked administrative power" and adds:
"There is no obvious reason for ignoring the legislative process
here." 5 And so it would seem that as the Regulations take on a
more permanent makeup and as the balance of payments deficits
continue, congressional involvement and supervision become more
pressing. Since the FDIR "have a potentially pervasive effect on
the nation's entire economy and on the rights and privileges of its
citizenry, under traditional democratic philosophy, the legislative
63. Comment, supra note 7, at 562.
64. Lancaster, supra note 1I, at 134-35.
65. Comment, supra note 7, at 539.
1972]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
branch of government should exercise ultimate control over their
dimension and contour. ' 6
Finally, two other benefits have occurred at the domestic level
as a result of the creation of OFDI-perhaps benefits of a lasting
nature:
First, the Regulations have created a vastly increased awareness
of the balance of payments problem, particularly in the business
community. Corporate executives have been forced to consider
the impact of their transactions in balance of payments terms.
In the process of adapting to the Regulations they have learned
the techniques for minimizing the adverse impact of their foreign
transactions. Hopefully, this awareness will continue to work for
the United States long after the Regulations have become relics.
The second benefit is the knowledge which has been gained by
the administrators of the Program. At the beginning of the effort,
the accounting techniques employed to adjust international mon-
etary reserves had never been matched with the commercial
transactions they were suppoesed to represent. The Program has
given added insight into this correlation and, as a result, has
given additional meaning to the balance of payments statistics.
This knowledge can be the cornerstone of a better and more
permanent solution to the balance of payments problem."7
C. At the International Level-The Effect of Repatriation upon
the DI
The limits placed upon authorized direct investment by the
FDIR force the DI to elect between repatriating that portion of
earnings that exceeds the authorized allowable or shifting those
earnings into holdings that do not qualify as liquid foreign bal-
ances. Since the latter is quite difficult to accomplish, the DI is
under pressure to seek the payment of dividends from its incorpo-
rated AFNs-that is, repatriation-rather than the reinvestment
or retention of earnings. Thus, the DI is placed in a position where
he must face the implicit repatriation reqiurement of the FDIR
and, on the other hand, contend with foreign governments and
shareholders in the operation of the foreign business. Foreign gov-
ernments, acting through exchange controls or other restrictions,
or shareholders, acting simply by outvoting, may effectively pre-
vent a DI from complying with the repatriation requirement. Of
66. Gaison & Miller, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations: Constitutional Ques-
tions and Operational Aspects Examined, I I B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 143, 173 (1970).
67. Note, supra note 53, at 176.
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course, a DI may be able to increase the amount repatriated from
AFNs in other countries not subject to such interference or struc-
ture any further investment plans around the use of long term
foreign borrowing. Yet each of these alternatives represents but a
possible course of action for the DI-he may find himself without
any effective way of fulfilling his investment objectives and needs.
The pressures put upon the DI who is not easily able to comply,
if at all, with the repatriation requirement find their counterpart,
ironically, in those put upon the DI who is able to comply, in that
such DI may find himself in violation of certain foreign corpora-
tion laws. One writer, focusing upon Europe, with its heavy con-
centration of United States foreign direct investment and its strict
limitations imposed by the FDIR in regard to increased investment
by Dis, poses the basic problem:
A decision by a DI not to reinvest the earnings of its AFNs raises
the important issue of "whether and to what extent the DI, in
complying with the Regulations, can cause the board or the
shareholder's meeting of the European subsidiary to determine
its reinvestment policy according to the DI's repatriation obliga-
tion rather than according to their best business judgment as
required under European corporation law." One can argue that
causing the payment of dividends by the AFN, where the rein-
vestment or retention of earnings would have been the clearly
appropriate internal business decision, violates the fiduciary obli-
gation of the DI as a member of management or as a controlling
shareholder to act in the corporate interest and to protect the
interests of minority shareholders."
The seeds are thus sown for conflicts at an international level as a
result of the FDIR.
D. At the International Level-The Effect of OFDI upon the
Host Countries
There is no question that the OFDI operates so as to interfere
in the economic affairs of the host countries in which the direct
investment is made. But there is some question as to whether the
interference is beneficial to the host countries or further proof of
American "economic imperialism."
Forced repatriation of earnings from AFNs, whether direct or
indirect, tends to deny the primacy and legitimacy of the host
68. Comment, supra note 7, at 547 (footnotes omitted).
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country's jurisdiction and control over its own economy, gives
credence to the claim that United States direct investment is
conducted primarily according to the needs of United States
economic policy, and raises suspicion within the host country
that its resources are being exploited. . . . The reaction of host
countries is entirely predictable: retaliation and reciprocal juris-
dictional claims will be made, and foreign states will treat Ameri-
can subsidiaries operating within their territory, as aliens, deny-
ing to them many of the benefits that are available to domestic
companies. More specifically, OFDI, in forcing American com-
panies to borrow extensively in Europe, may cause local firms
considerable anguish if credit is tight: American firms are good
risks. Also there is no doubt that the Regulations will worsen the
balance of payments position of host countries to the extent that
capital investment inflow is restricted and earnings are forcibly
repatriated. To many observers, the Reglations represent but
another American interference in the affairs of other countries
and but further proof of American "economic imperialism."69
Of course, American "economic imperialism" has its justification.
The argument is that this country has a legitimate interest in regu-
lating the overseas investment of its nationals, even where that
regulation indirectly affects the operations of foreign business enti-
ties, and the balance of payments accounts of other nations."0 Thus,
since "many AFNs, especially wholly owned subsidiaries, are de-
spite the 'veil' of foreign incorporation, still part of an overall
United States enterprise, affecting and operating in the interests of
that enterprise, ' 7" regulation of them by OFDI serves an economic
purpose of a protective nature rather than one of an expansionary
nature.
The above justification, though resting on logical grounds, has
run into considerable difficulties in practice, compounded by an
ever-increasing emotional hostility in many countries of the world
towards United States foreign direct investment. Witness, for ex-
ample, the growing number of expropriations of United States
investments in various foreign states. But it cannot be denied that
American investment does bring distinct and considerable advan-
tages to host countries. The inflow of capital, technical know-how,
advanced technology, capital goods, and managerial expertise to
the host countries together with the increase in exports from the
69. Id. at 549-50 (footnote omitted).




host countries and generated by American investment constitute
benefits of a very significant and lasting nature. Host nations wish-
ing to strengthen their industrial and technological capacity with
maximum speed and minimum expense do need the benefits of
American investment abroad.72 Thus, conflicts between host coun-
tries and OFDI may be unavoidable as long as the need for Ameri-
can investment abroad continues.
One possible effect of OFDI on the international community
of both economic and political significance
is that the program falls heaviest on the multinational enterprise
and, in effect, represents a step, even though unilateral, toward
their control. The Regulations may encourage further action in
this area by foreign governments and may ultimately result in
international agreements. The United States, then may indirectly
be forcing the world's hand on an issue in need of considerable
attention. .... 71
Because of this effect, it is likely that the FDIR or some form of
them will become a permanent fixture of United States economic
policy.
VIII. CAN THE FDIR BE REMOVED?-SHOULD THEY BE
REMOVED?
Upon balance of payments considerations, the purpose of the
FDIR were and are simply to reduce the outflow of American
funds expended in direct investment. Since the Regulations operate
to shift financing of United States direct investment to foreign
capital markets, not only by direct investors in their own right but
also through increased foreign affiliate borrowing, and since long
term foreign borrowings have steadily increased since 1968, 7 it
appears the Regulations are fulfilling the above purpose. Indeed,
the implementation of such controls has belied the fear that they
would hurt the United States' competitive position in the world
market place because investment opportunities would be lost to
other countries and would be difficult to ever regain.
Yet the use of long term borrowing by DIs presents a future
problem with considerable significance for the United States bal-
ance of payments. As one professor of law explains:
72. See Comment, supra note 10, at 885 n.35.
73. Comment, supra note 7, at 563-64.
74. OFFICE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, RESULTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT PROGRAM IN 1970, (July 29, 1971) (reprints available upon request).
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[T]he very success of the Administration in diverting American
business to foreign capital markets may serve to "lock in" the
Program . . . .If restrictions on outflows of American capital
are removed, then the only factor preventing American business
from retiring its Eurodollar offerings will be the difference in
interest rates prevailing between the Eurodollar bond market and
the United States capital markets. The outstanding foreign in-
debtedness of American corporations . . . is referred to as the
"overhang" in OFDI circles. This huge potential outflow is pres-
ently held up only by the Regulations, which treat repayment of
foreign borrowing as a transfer of capital to the extent that the
proceeds were spent in foreign direct investment.75
Thus, it appears that any future outflow to pay off the considerable
debt overhang will itself have to be regulated, though not necessar-
ily through the use of a full OFDI program. However, one writer
believes little, if any, regulation would be necessary if the controls
were ended, and cautions against retaining the controls merely
because of the huge debt overhang:
[T]he argument that a sudden end to the controls might cause
massive refinancing of outstanding foreign borrowing is a shal-
low reason for retaining the controls. The interest rate differen-
tial which motivates the desire to refinance foreign loans could
easily be eliminated by a tax applicable to refinancing. Alterna-
tively, refinancing of outstanding long-term foreign borrowing
could be prohibited altogether as a condition on the revocation
of the controls. Moreover, the argument is self-defeating. The
longer the controls remain in effect the more serious the refinanc-
ing problem will become as more and more borrowing accumu-
lates."
The necessity to obtain foreign financing may entail certain
disadvantages for Dis:
[T]he necessity to obtain foreign financing may force many to
borrow who have funds of their own available. Foreign financing
sought in foreign capital markets may not be available to small
and medium-sized investors or may be more costly than funds
obtained from United States sources. Also, although foreign fi-
nancing has been readily available until now, should foreign capi-
tal markets tighten or the interest expense differential widen,
then the purpose of the program-to shift the financing of for-
75. Lancaster, supra note 1I, at 93-94 (footnotes omitted).
76. Note, supra note 53, at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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eign investment without interfering in the investment pro-
cess-will have been undermined. 77
The OFDI, however, has addressed itself to the problem of non-
availability of foreign financing by allowing applications for speci-
fic authorizations of positive direct investment in excess of the
applicable amounts generally authorized under the Regulations.78
In conclusion, this writer does again refer to the previously
discussed four priorities with which foreign investment should be
concerned79 and the effect of the OFDI upon them. Surprisingly,
the FDIR have not functioned as investment "curbs" since regu-
lated foreign direct investment has steadily increased since the
"curbs" were instituted8
-no doubt because of the reliance on long
term foreign borrowing and the increasing of the allowables. Thus,
it would appear that the domestic economy of the United States
has been strengthened through the returns on the invested capi-
tal-that is, the inflow of capital to the United States-and the
individual investor's own wealth has been increased as well. For-
eign investment cannot but promote economic development in the
countries in which the investments are made, and this third priority
appears to be well satisfied. However, the goal still remains of
"developing a healthy and stable international economic situation,
kept so through sound monetary policies and an extremely high
degree of international cooperation. 81 The United States' balance
of payments crisis remains after the creation of the FDIR because
they represent only a response to that crisis-perhaps favorable,
perhaps not-but not an attempt to deal with the major causes of
the crisis.
Viewed in the most favorable light, the regulation of foreign
direct investment will result in an immediate improvement in the
United States balance of payments position. At worst, the Regu-
lations will ultimately lead to a reduction of future capital inflow
to the extent that the payments deficit can be corrected only by
devaluing the dollar. Regardless of the outcome, it is demonstra-
bly clear that the underlying reasons for the balance of payments
deficit are attributable to causes other than foreign direct invest-
ment. Until the economic planners in Washington recognize that
77. Comment, supra note 7, at 557-58.
78. See note 50 supra.
79. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 74 supra.
81. Weeks, supra note I, at 250.
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the real source of the financial difficulties of the United States
stem from the domestic and international fiscal policies of the
Government, the deficit crisis will continue to grow, and further
tightening of controls over private enterprise will be convenient
solutions.82
JEFFREY B. GREEN
82. Young, supra note 5, at 446 (footnote omitted).
